Benefit/Cost Analysis
•
of U.S. Demining 1n
Ethiopia and Eritrea
A Benefit/ Cost (B/C} Analysis is a tool used to compare the rewards reaped
by a program to the costs expended to accomplish it. The author discusses
the B/ C analysis of demining operations in Ethiopia and Eritrea and
extrapolates the meaning of the results.

by Major M ichael Litzelman,
U.S. Special Operations
Command
Based on B/C theo ry, an analysis
comparing the benefits co the costs of a
program (benefits and costs received now
and later, quamifiable and non-quantifiab le) can be determin ed to assist the
Unite d States in co ntrollin g AP
landmines through an America n- led
demining program. In this study, B/C
analys is is used as a cool to evaluate the
issue of the relevancy of using Department of Defense (DoD) dollars for a particular kind of humanitarian assistance
program, demining AP landmines.
There is an importallt U.S. interest
co controllandmines, especially those rhar
are imbedded in rhe land of countries that
are of national and viral interest ro rh e
United States and irs allies. Reducing or
elim inating these weapons may help to
stabilize an important area and region
inimical co U.S. interests. T he existence
of landmines has led to economic and
pol itical calam ity and creates a greater
cha nce of them being used by a faction
o r group aga inst innocent civilians or
even U .S. personnel. AP landmines may
sustain a culture of conflict and violence.
Therefore, it may be in the United States'
interest w ul timately assist in eliminating these undiscriminating weapons,
which could be of direct benefit ro the
United States and host nations (HNs).
Data will be reviewed to calculate

primary and secondary costs saved as a
result of the U.S. Army's demining program in Ethiopia and Eritrea. This study
will measure rhe social costs oflandmines
using the B/C approach and the social

cost of removing the mines by quanrifying as many primary and secondary benefits as possibl e. Examples of primary
benefits include preventing loss oflife and
limb. Secondary benefits may include
land, farming and in frast ructure, which
are part of an economic/social benefit and
which can be used as a result of demining.
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M ea suring Benefits and
Costs
The U.S. government (USG)
Demining Program Funds, which are the
actual sources of rhe (U.S.) funds and
costs from FY93-FY97 of the Demining
Program will be analyzed, as will the coral amount of funds used for demining
in Ethiopia.
Matrixes of compiled performance
impact data will be used to indicate some
of the HN benefits of the Demining Program, although the reader should keep
in mind rhar some of these impacts, taken
by themselves, are non-quantifiable. This
data was acquired from the Special Operations (Central) Command, MacDill
Air Fo rce Base, which received the data
from the demi ning cen ters in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia, and As mara, Erirrea,
and shou ld be considered reliable. Th is
study will recommend the demining program if there is a greater excess of benefits
over costs; and if rhe coral projected benefits
are less than rhe total costs, the project will
be deemed not worth underraking. 1
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Costs from AP
La ndmines 2
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Much of the costs from FY93-FY95
were used for rhe ini tial start-up cost of
rhe demining infrastructure, which included renovating the demining headquarters and the training fac ilities, etc.
These were the most significant costs at
the start of the program. U .S. Army trainers and liaison personnel were sent to the
HN in 1995 in order ro complete the
stan-up phase and train rhe trainers. The
total number of mines eliminated is imponanr in respect to the fact that th ere
are m ines that could kill or injure if left
in place. The number of hectares (one
hectare is equal to I 0,000 square meters
or 2.47 1 acres) and amount of roadway
clea red indicares land char is now available for productive use.
In sum, in Ethiopia, $6,089,000
(U.S .) was sp ent from FY93-FY97 ro
el iminate 325,625 m ines char could potentially have caused injuries or death. As
a result of demining, over 7,391 hectares
have been cleared and are available for
productive use, 285 kilometers of road

are now available to rhe populace, and
159 villages were cleared of landmin es.
For Eritrea, $6,005,000 was expended for
the demining program during this rim e
period, and, as a result, 43 villages were
cleared. Over4,750 land mines were eliminated. As a result of rhe demining, over
26 1 hectares were cleared, and 35 kilometers of road are now available for productive use.3 The dollar con triburions of
the H Ns were not available."

on expected production
without the min es, agricultural production could increase by three to six percent. T here were also costs associated with
disabi li ties. The m osr common inj ury
among survivors of landmin e incidents
is the loss of a leg. Many victims had to
undergo multiple operations for their
injuries. More than hal f of all victims were
admitted, each spending an average of
rwo months in a hospiral.

Primary and Secondary
Benefits5 or Costs Saved

Analysis

Primary benefi ts include preventing
people fro m being ki ll ed, inj u red or
maimed by landmines, as well as the benefit of saving med ical costs co treat and
rehabilitate person nel. Additional benefits that are directly due co demining
include evacuarion of rhe wounded, surgical treatment, transfusion of blood, rehabilitarion (often including prosthetic
limbs, which must be fitted indi vidually
and must be replaced after some years).
Severe disabili ty can lead, of course, to
other incalculable costs. 6·7 Econom ic and
social co nsequences of mines, wh ich also
transla te ro secondary benefits, might
include farmland, firewood and d rinking
water that would have been inaccessible
because of the mines, as well as roads or
tracks that would be impassable because
of the landmines.
This st ud y use d data from
Anderson's study, which documenred the
effecrs of landm ines on the health and
social con ditions of co mmunities in
32,904 households with 174,489 people
living in communities of four affected
countries, including 37 in Afghanistan,
66 in Bosnia, 38 in Cambod ia and 65 in
Mozambique. Since Mozambique is similar to Ethiopia and Eritrea in many ways
(culturally, geographically, ere.), this
study used these findings as a surrogate
market, as suggested by Gram lich,8 to
ex trapolate some of the possible costs
saved for Ethi opia. Fo r example, this research determined the costs of death and
injury based on data from Ethiopia, using th e following information from
Mozambique: in Mozambi que, each blast
killed 1.45 people and wounded 1.27 .
Roughly 40 percent of blasts resul ted in
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The primary benefits rhar this study
will consider include lives saved (deaths
from each blasr), injuries prevented (injuries fro m each blast), transportation
saved (cost of fees to the hospital), adm ission charge saved, bed charges saved ,
blood saved (or cost of blood saved) and
amputation costs saved. Some of those
figures for the method were taken from
the study dealing wi th Mozambique. 9
All of the benefits ofdemining, however, cann ot be quanrified. 10 T he study
focused on only those benefits that can
be quantified , such as the benefits of
human life, the benefi ts obtained from
using land that was once mined and the
future benefits from saving the lives of
farm animals. 11
In order ro calculate whether the
demining program will have net benefits
over time, this study calculated present
values. Present value is a stream of benefits or costs expressed as the expected
value in each year, discounted by the interest rare compounded over that time.
Non-comparable benefits and costs can
be made comparable by expressing everything in present value terms, wh ich could
indicate benefits realized over a period of
time. C osts, especially for the start-up
(i.e., bu ilding infrastructure), will be indicated up-front, while som e costs, such
as monitoring the demining progress, will
be recurrent. In this case, the study rraced
out costs and benefits over rime (i.e., over
a 30-year period, or other projectio ns in
the future) and potential maxi mum benefits.

Calculating Primary
Benefits of Demining

Costs of lives saved is calculated using $550 in Ethiopia and $660 in Eritrea,
the 1998 annual per capita income (per
capita used since all victims would include men, women and ch ildren), and
multiplying by rhe average number of
lives saved per year as a result of th e
demining program . Data in the last
couple of years for Ethiopia indicate between 60 and 120 Iives are lost due to
the landmines per year. Approximately 76
lives were lost in FY97; divided by 1.45
(52 blasts), this yielded 76 deaths. Seventy-six lives saved multiplied by $550,
would mean $4 1,800 saved in Ethiopia
for one year. E ritrea lost an ave rage of 10
civilians in FY97, 10 lives saved multiplied by $660 yearly per capita inco me
equals $6,600 saved per year.
Calculati ons of other benefits were

as follows:
• Injuries prevented: In Ethiopia, 44
persons inju red divided by 1.27 from 35
blasts, wh ich yielded 44 injured (Anderson 1995). 12 Eritrea averaged 20 personnel injured per year.
• Transportation costs saved: Fees to
a hospital could range from $2.40 to
$4.80. 13 T his study used the lowest, conservative number ($2.40).
• Admissio n charge saved: the admission charge saved could range fro m
$2.40 to $16.00. 13 Again, this study used
the lowest co nservative number ($2.40).
• Bed charges saved: Bed charges (flat
rate fee) saved has been approximated to
be $.80.' 3
• Blood saved: Generally, for every
100 landmine patients, 120 units of
blood are required. A unit of blood costs

Ethiopia Net Benefits
(76 lives x $528 = $40,128 for FY97)

10Years

3%

10%

5%

Primary Benefits
Secondary Benefits
Total Benefits
Total Costs

$348,547
$2,213,981
$2,562,528
$6,089,000

$315,838
$2,001,284
$2,317,122
$6,089,000

$252,517
$1,108,542
$1,361,059
$6,089,000

Net Benefits

($3,526,472)

($3,771,878)

($4,727,941)

Primary Benefits
Secondary Benefits
Total Benefits
Total Costs

$485,314
$3,104,239
$3,589,553
$6,089,000

$422,786
$2,686,354
$3,109,140
$6,089,000

$311,258
$1,970,982
$2,282,240
$6,089,000

Net Benefits

($2,499,447)

($2,979,860)

($3,806,760)

Primary Benefits
Secondary Benefits
Total Benefits
Total Costs

$603,697
$3,860,107
$4,463,804
$6,089,000

$506,501
$3,226,555
$3,733,056
$6,089,000

$347,809
$2,208,038
$2,555,847
$6,089,000

Net Benefits

($1,625,196)

($2,355,944)

($3,533,153)

Primary Benefits
Secondary Benefits
Total Benefits
Total Costs

$705,977
$4,512,122
$5,218,099
$6,089,000

$572,082
$3,655,232
$4,227,314
$6,089,000

$370,469
$2,362,155
$2,732,624
$6,089,000

Net Benefits

($870,901)

($1,861,686)

($3,356,376)

Primary Benefits
Secondary Benefits
Total Benefits
Total Costs

$793,972
$5,082,090
$5,876,062
$6,089,000

$623,430
$3,988,775
$4,612,205
$6,089,000

$384,536
$2,444,820
$2,829,356
$6,089,000

Net Benefits

($212,938)

($1,476,795)

($3,259,644)

15Years

20Years

25Years

30Years
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about $20, and a unit of saline costs approximately $1.00. 14
• Amputation costs saved: Mine amputees may require a total of320 units of
blood per 100 patients. 14
• Rehabilitation costs saved: It costs
approx imately $125 to replace one lim b.
The lower boundary fo r this study is the
income for men, women and children
(per capita) for workers or no n-workers.
In regards to the wages of the Ethiopian
demi ncrs, the wages are the same as they
receive while serving in the Eth iop ian
army. They cannot leave a job in the army
si nce other jobs would be difficult to find.
l t does nor m atter how the individual
deminer values their life (utility). 15

Data Used to Calculate
Secondary Benefits of
Demining
This study was able to quantifY the
dollar value of cultivable land and accessible grazing land, as well as the increase
of forestry as a result of land being
demined, usi ng gross domestic product
figures for FY93 for commercial purposes
(agricultu re, grazing, forestry and fish ing),
using proj ected present value at FY97,
and d ata of cleared land from FY97.
Calculation of seco ndary benefits
were as follows:
• Total area cleared: For one year in
Ethiopia, the to tal area cleared was 6,112
hectares or 15,1 02 acres, and for Eritrea,
26 1 hectares cleared or 645 acres. The
value per acre of land in Ethiopia is $ 14,
whereas in Eritrea, which is th ree times
smaller and much more arid and dry, the
value per acre is $93.40.
• Increase C ulti vabl e Land: Of
Ethiopia's to tal land, 12.7 percenr is used
for growing crops, and in Eritrea, only five
percent of the land is considered arable.
• Accessible Grazing Land: In Ethiopia, 40.8 percent of the total land is used
for grazing, which also applies ro Eritrea.
• Forestry/Wood Industry: Of
Ethiopia's total land, 24.6 percent is used
as forest and woodland, whereas only five
percent of Eritrea's land is used for these
purposes.
• Livestock Saved: In Ethiopia,
l ,478 animals were lost in FY97, which
when multiplied by $1 14, the value fo r

each animal lost, is equal to $168,492 in
animals saved by demining. Eritrea only
lost a reported total of six livestock due
ro landm ines in FY97. This amounts to
a value of $9 16 lost in that year.
T he total worth of the above primary
and secondary benefits over time was calculated using percentages of discount
rates, calculating rhe net benefits for the
present value (tracing our costs and benefits over time) of the maximum benefits
over I 0, 12, 15, 20, 25 and 30 years at
the discount rates of three percent (minimum rate), five percent and I 0 percent
(maximum rate) .
The net benefi ts for each of the
above periods at each of the above discount rates is composed of rhe addition
of primary and secondary benefits, which
equals total benefits, and which is a rea-

sonable range over rime. The total cost
of the program (FY93- FY97) is then subtracted from the total benefits in order
to calculate rhe net benefits. These calculations could also demonstrate the option of doing nothing. Sensitivity is the
change of assum ptions, such as the num ber of potential victims saved and the
ranges of plausible values. The Net Benefits Spreadsheet for both Ethiopia and
Eritrea (listed below) enabled this study
to find the range of reasonable values,
co mparing the d iscou nt rates with the
maximum benefits over the above years.
T he Net Benefit Spreadsh eet indicates that shortfalls or costs are greater
than the benefits and were almost exclusively and predictably evident throughout the demining process evident in both
Ethiopia and Eritrea, regardless of the

Eritrea Net Benefits
(10 lives x $622 = $6,220 for FY97)

10Years

3%

5%

10%

Prim ary Benefits
Secondary Benefits
Tota l Benefits
Total Costs

$55,530
$443,704
$499,234
$6,005,000

$50,460
$401,499
$451,959
$6,005,000

$40,892
$319,864
$360,756
$6,005,000

Net Benefits

($5,505, 766)

($5,553,041)

($5,644,244)

Primary Benefits
Secondary Benefits
Total Benefits
Total Costs

$76,808
$621,401
$698,209
$6,005,000

$67,040
$539,773
$606,813
$6,005,000

$49,995
$395,943
$445,938
$6,005,000

Net Benefits

($5,306,791)

($5,398,187)

($5,559,062)

Prima ry Ben·efits
Secondary Benefits
Total Benefits
Total Costs

$95,131
$774,116
$869,247
$6,005,000

$80,015
$648,058
$728,073
$6,005,000

$55,658
$443,148
$498,806
$6,005,000

Net Benefits

($5,135,753)

($5,276,927)

($5,506,194)

Primary Benefits
Secondary Benefits
Total Benefits
Total Costs

$110,928
$905,729
$1,016,657
$6,005,000

$88,842
$733,018
$821,860
$6,005,000

$59,168
$473,124
$532,292
$6,005,000

Net Benefits

($4,988,343)

($5,183,140)

($5,472, 708)

Prima ry Benefits
Secondary Benefits
Total Benefits
Total Costs

$124,566
$1,019,568
$1,144,134
$6,005,000

$98,136
$799,103
$897,239
$6,005,000

$61,347
$490,898
$522,245
$6,005,000

Net Benefits

($4,860,866)

($5,107,761)

($5,482,755)

15 Years

20Years

25Years

30Years
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discounr period or year. T he data and
analysis indicates that demining is not an
appropriate B/C study for the United
States when only the quantifiable benefits and costs are analyzed over 30 years.

Summary and
Implications
This swdy was only able to quantifY
selective primary and secondary benefits,
and other benefits that are non-quantifi able were considered. Costs saved due to
eliminating deaths are what actually drive
the costs of the landm ines.
The data and analysis indicate that
demin ing is not an appropriate subject
for benefit and cost study. Although costs
have come early, which is typical for B/C
analysis, benefits only exceed costs in two
situations. Using the present value methods of comparing future costs and benefits (p rimary and secondary) i.e., li ves
and injuries of HN personnel indicates
that benefits do not exceed costs in either country regardless of the d iscount
rare or years in operation (one to 30
years). Benefits do not exceed costs in
Ethiopia and Eritrea at any point in this
study. In terms of benefits and costs, the
U.S. demining program should nor expeer benefits to exceed costs within 30
years. However, if human lives and quality of life are to be taken seriously, th is
humanitarian benefit should be enough
for the United States to co ntribute a
demining program to these countries. In
terms of these lives, something should be
done in order to prevent the potential loss
of life and limb. The fo llowing table lists
the benefits and costs of the U.S./HN
demining program.
The non-quantifiable benefits fo r
the United States appear to vastly outweigh the costs ($6 mi llion) of rhe
dem ining program. For the HN, quantifiable and non-quantifiable benefits far
outweigh the costs, especially if one rakes
into account the primary and secondary
benefits of Ethiopia.
For a demining operation, one could
determine the winners and losers. Losers
of the progra m could include the Ame rican taxpayer, if one were to just count
the U.S. quantifiable benefi ts. If one were
to rake into account the U.S. non-quan-

tifiable benefits, the American taxpayer
would be a winner (see above list). The
United States may eventually be able to
gain many of these benefits whi le on ly
supporting the start-up of the program.
One unforeseen benefit from American assistance to Ethiopia was support
from the coumry at a crucial rime when
U.S. viral interests were at stake. After the
U nited States supported communis t
Eth iopi a during t he i r devastating

droughts in the 1980s, Ethiopia in turn
voted for a critical American resolution
in the UN Security Cou ncil to support a
military build-up after the invasion of
Kuwait by Iraq in 1990.
" Ethiopia's greatest potential to improve t h ei r councry eco nomically is
through the promise of agricultural developmem because of the fertile soil and
rainfall. It accounts for 47 percent of the
G ross D omestic Product (GOP) and Is

Benefits and Casts of U.S. Demlnlng Programs In Ethiopia and Eritrea
U.S. QUANTIFIABLE COSTS
None

U.S. QUANTIFIABLE BENEFITS
None

U.S. NON-QUANTIFIABLE BENEFITS
Creating intangible moral, humanitarian benefits
Promote regional and country stability in HN
Creates friendly countries amicable to U.S. interests
HN more supportive to U.S. interests
Strengthens relations with HN
Attainment of U.S. foreign policy objectives
Access to foreign bases and transport facilities
Provide example of how military con promote good
Provides military access to DoD
Provides political access to DOS
Creates intelligence gathering
Provides Commanders-in-chief with peace-time means
of achieving goals
Provide training benefit to Special Operations Forces
Increases morale among U.S. troops
Provides humanitarian support to war-torn HN
Benefits U.S. demining companies
Boosts mine clearing U.S. technologies
Enhanced public relations with international community
Enhanced foreign policy in public relations and good will
Access to regional transportation
Agriculture benefits (importation of HN goods)

U.S. NON-QUANTIFIABLE COSTS
Threatens readiness for some troops

HN QUANTIFIABLE COSTS
HN QUANTIFIABLE BENEFITS
Data not available
Ethiopia: 292,791 landmines destroyed
Eritrea: 2,852 londmines destroyed
For both Ethiopia/ Eritrea: 500,000 potential lives saved
76 lives saved per year for Ethiopia
10 lives saved for Eritrea
44 injuries saved per year in Ethiopia
20 injuries saved for Eritrea
1,478 livestock saved per year for Ethiopia
6 for Eritrea
For both Ethiopia/ Eritreo: 11 facilities constructed
and renovated120 vehicles for demining
15,102 acres cleared for Ethiopia
645 acres cleared in Eritrea
282 km of infrastructure cleared in Ethiopia
35 cleared in Eritrea
97 Trainers trained in demining, public awareness, and
historical research, and 356 HN personnel trained
$12,000 influx of U.S. dollars in local economy
HN NON-QUANTIFIABLE BENEFITS
Contribute toward stabilization in HN
Coordination for donations provided by
other countries and U.S. organizations
Active employment of soldiers for peaceful means
Assistance with infrastructure development
Increase of prestige and security from U.S. alliances
Potential increases the rote of repatriation of refugees
Reduce unemployment increases (costs)
Donations of medical aid packages

HN NON-QUANTIFIABLE COSTS
Potential loss of sovereignty
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the most important secto r of rh e
eco nomy." 16 Agricultural development
has been potentially expanded to regions
that were demined. Mi ne incidents have
significantl y decreased with the local
herdsmen and farmers, which has co ntributed to the successes of the nations as
a result of the U.S. dem ining program
accordin g to MSG Barthol om ew and
MSG Johnson. 17 H owever, there is as yet
no data to support th at assertion by these
two individuals who played a large part
in setting up the demining program in
both cou ntries.
Other benefits, in terms of the U.S.
demining programs' original goals and
objectives a re listed below. 18
(1) Enabling the U nited States to
make a tangible diffe re nce to people
struggling to rebuild their lives after long
years of war: The DoD has provided U.S.
trainers who have train ed the Ethiopians
and Eritreans in demining, public awareness and historical research. Since 1993,
rhe U.S. demining program has produced
more tangible be nefits in Ethiopia than
in Eritrea, i. e., 325,625 mines eliminated
and 15, I 02 acres cleared in Ethiopia versus 4,750 mines destroyed and 645 acres
cleared in Eritrea. In Ethiopia, 285 roadways have b een cleared, versus 35 in
Eritrea. U.S. trainers also provided humanitarian donations in veh icles (more
than I 20) for both countri es and medical aid packages (medical, equipment-related and ambulatory). They also assisted
in creating a demin ing infrastructure by
supporting the construction and renovation of 1 I facili ties. The United States
has helped to conduct emergency medical care in hospitals and implemen ted
new surgical techniq ues fo r injuries as a
result of landmin es, in addition to suppl ying mine detection d evices, publi c
awareness training, hisrorical research and
demining training. U .S. demining may
also help to redistribute some wealth from
the United States ro the Eth iopian gove rnm ent. For example, some costs have
been inflated for some services to get
Ethiopian participation, such as the costs
of contracting the transportation for the
demin in g eq uipment, wh ich totaled
$ 12,000. The U.S. government has also
led support including coordination for
donations provided by other cou ntries

and other organizations. 17· 19 ln addition,
the United States has helped governments
such as Ethiopia and Eritrea help themselves by educating civilians on the dam ages and locations of landm in es, and by
prov iding badly needed humanitarian
support to th ese wa r- torn countries.
T hese benefits are manifest, tangible,
q ua ntifiable achievements. If impl emented , the primary and secondary benefits, as listed in this article, can make a
real difference in the lives of the common people of Ethiopia.
(2) Promoting stabili ty by enabl ing
countries to better solve their problems,
rebuild their eco nomies and build public co nfidence in th eir governments by
mee ting th e n eed s of th e peopl e.
D emining programs do not produce a
panacea. Today, Ethiopia appears to be
stable within its own borders, but the U.S.
demining program has not directly produced stabi li ty betwee n Ethiopia and
Eri trea in terms of preventi ng these countries from fighting one a nother. From
May 1998 to June 2000, fighting broke
out along a disputed border area of these
two countries. T he Un ited Stares esti mated that between 50,000 and I 00,000
soldiers died, with both countries using
valuable reso urces to buy mili tary hardwa re to fight each other. 20
Some othe r potential benefits that
have been lauded have been regional stability, promotion of de mocracy and economic development. 2 1 Wi th rhe fighting
occ urring in the Horn of Africa between
Ethiopia and Eritrea, regional stability has
not been a be nefi t, although demining
has helped to li mit the accessibi lity of
m ines that were destroyed to rhese co untries' arsenals . .In regards to promoting
democracy, Ethiopian citizens have been
repressed , a nd some have actually been
to rtured after being arrested. 15· 22 H owever, som e inroads have been made toward democracy. W hen Ethiop ia claimed
victory in May of2000, it came ahead of
general elections scheduled on May 14 ,
on ly the second general election in rhe
country's history. An esti mated 20 millio n registered voters chose me mbers of
the 548-seat federal parliament, nine regional assemblies, and rwo citycouncils. 2.l· 24
T his study has shown that Ethiopia
has misused vehicles for purposes other

than demin ing, their original intended
use; in addition , an American renovated
headquarters in Ethiopia is being used as
a military academy. Agriculture, grazing
and forestry developm ent may also be
expanded as a result of demining for both
countries, although no data exists as to
whether this land is being productively used.
(3) Strength ening U.S. relat ions
with these governmenrs at a critical rime
in wh ich rhe governments are engaged in
nation -b uilding. There is no way of
knowing whether rhe access and trust
gained from the demining programs directly produced confli ct resolution in the
case of Ethiopia and Eritrea during their
recent war. Although the U.S. government was unable to stop both sides fro m
fighting o ne another in the early part of
rhe conflict, it did help to persuade both
sides to negoti ate an end to the conflict
in June of 2000. Such international organizations as rh e European Union and
the Organization of African Uni ty as well
as UN Secretary Kofi An nan appear to
have had litrle influence in the recent
confli cr. 25 A question re mains as to the
degree ofAmerica n influence with Ethiopia and Eritrea.
(4) Providing a valuable example ro
these countries of how a military can promote the public good rather than just
wage war and oppress peopl e. As mentioned above, the demining program is
promoting publi c good and has shown
its citizens that rhe military can be used
fo r other purposes than oppressing irs
own people, although some of the resou rces, as noted ea rlier in this article,
have been used for other purposes. Some
critics are also alarmed that foreign governme nts, such as the United States, donate hundreds of millions of dollars in
aid, despite mounting allegations of human rights violations. 26
(5) Providing an invaluable training
benefi t to U.S. troops, giving them experience in relating to d iverse cul tures,
organ izing prog rams in sparse, fore ign
environments and honing foreign language ski lls. Readiness is supposed to be
e nhanced with uni ts and personnel exercisi ng joinr a nd inrer-service operations,
and critical wartime skills are practiced.
However, some of the military ch iefs have
questioned whether readiness has actu-
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ally been enhanced as a result of the numerous deployments, wh ich have resulted
in less train ing for service p ersonnel.
W inslo w Wheeler, a d efense a n alyst
" ... found evidence of extremely serious
Army-wide personnel a nd training problems. The Senate Budget Committee appeared primed to join the critics of the
adm inistration who say the Pentagon robs
readiness accounts to pay for peacekeeping operations. An internal report by the
panel's senior defense analyst has concluded
that Army readiness at irs tvvo major stareside combat training centers is inadequa te
and could become even worse .... "27
This study has found that th is may
be true for peacekeeping operations, bur
not for the humanitarian demining operations, which consist of Special Operation Forces (SOF). lnitially, U.S. Special
Operation soldie rs 28 gained access and experience, but th is was generally during
the period of building its demining infrastructure, while training the Ethiopian
soldi ers how to train their own personnel. Since then, only a few liaison officers have gained rhat experience. SOF soldiers have continued ro train in-country,
but on other soldier tasks (i.e., in fant ry
skills) as well. A demining program could
o nly co nsist of a few months, deployment
for these el ite personnel, who would train
the host nationals.
(6) Gene rall y increas in g morale
among U.S. troops while enabl ing them
to engage in acti vities wirh measurable
benefi ts that are greatly appreciated by
the host population. Morale among U.S.
troops has nor been surveyed.

Conclusion
In sum, there is normally a lack of
competitio n for a pub Iic good, especially
a purely public good, such as a demining
program. Co mpetition is necessary to
prevent market failure (and non -marker
failure). Sus t a in ed co mp etitio n in
deminin g operations from the ini ti al
implementation by the United Stares ro
the sustainment by UN fo rces and
NGOs , with co operation from HN
demining programs should produce th is
essential public good of demining. The
long term winners from demining operations
are the H N people and their government;

the short-term losers are those who fund
the program, especially paying ou r the
capital expenses, i.e., American taxpayers.
But rhe Un ited Stares will also benefi r in
rhe longterm as the projected non-quantifiable benefi ts indicate. •
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The U.S. Humanitarian Demining Research and Development (R&D) Program
rapidly develops, evaluates and demonstrates equipment for humanitarian
demi ning, hoping to improve the overall safety of the individual deminer
and t he efficiency of humanitarian demining operations worldwide. By
colla borating with a number of different members of the humanitarian
demining community, the R&D Program strives to cater to the needs of those
in the field and effectively fill any tech nology gaps as quickly as possible.
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The U.S. Humanitarian
Demining Research and
Development Program

History
The U.S. H u manitarian Demin ing
R&D P rogram was conceived in late
1992 and early 1993, when the D irector
for Acquisitio n in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD) for
Special Operations and Low-Inrensity
Conflict (SO/UC) deve loped several
concept proposals fo r a rapid-prototype
program. The Undersecretaries of Policy
and Acquisition supported the proposal,
considering it a logical and necessary
technology in itia tive to be part of SO/
LIC's rasks in the low-intensity and peacerime engagement arena. When the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) SO/U C
requested support, fund ing was identified in the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency and was scheduled to
begin in Fiscal Year (FY) 1996. Decid ing
rhar there was a more immediate need
for the program, Congress provided addit io n al fu n ds to the U .S. Army's
C ountermine Program to fu nd hu ma nitarian demining fo r FY 1995. Congress
has conti nued to support the R&D Program.
Since the p rogram's beginnings, the
Department of Defense (DoD) has been
researching cost-effective tech nologies for
the demining com m un ity. Since then ,
sign ificant p rogress has been made in
developing and im proving tools and technologies fo r humanitarian de m ining.
These devices assist in clearing, detect-

ing, marking, mapping and neu tralizing
mines, p rotecting deminers, clearing vegetation and promoting m ine awareness.
T he most successful of these have been
deployed in nations all over th e world to
undergo field resting.
The DoD Humanitarian Demining
R&D Program is parr of the Nigh t Vision and Electronic Sensors D irectorate
(NVESD) at Fort Belvoi r, Vi rginia. The
Program strives "to provide suitable technology to derect and clear all landm ines,
improve operato r safety, and provide special small and handheld tools for operators."1 According to a video on the
program's website, "The Humanitarian
Demining R&D Program focuses on the
testing, demonstratio n and validation of
various eq uipmenrs suitable for immediate use in various international hu man itarian demining m ission envi ron ments." 2

How the Program Works
T he program operates on a multiyear investment strategy as follows:
o An nual requ irements workshops
involving people from affected coumries
are used to identifY system requi remems.
o Data analyses and assessments determ ine rhe system requiremems in rwo ways:
I . Determining rhe performance capabi lities of commercially available metal
detectors to identifY AP mines in countries
where a significant number of mine-related
111Juries are occurring.
2. ldemifYing where technology voids
exist.
o Marker surveys identifY commer-
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cially available items for detection and
clearance, which are rhen sorted and stored
in fu lly searchable databases. The databases are updated and maintained on the
Internet, and th ey serve as the basis fo r
identifYing available eq uipment rhat may
be suitable for Humanitarian Demining.
0
Developmental rests are conducted
at FortAP Hill, which has the ranges ro support live and inert mine testing. From these
rests, changes are recommended and implemented, after which the tools are retested.
0
In-co untry fie ld-testing is perfo rmed and suppon traini ng is conducted
for indigenous personnel wirh multi-l in gual multimedia on equipment operation.
T he real driving fo rce behind the
R&D Program is its Annual Requi rements Worksh op, held in no rthern Virgin ia. Demi ners from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Mine Action Centers (MACs) attend this event
to give an update on their programs' technology requirements. This is the best way
for the R&D Program to get feedback
on cu rrent projects and ideas for the future. It also gives dem iners from all over
rhe wo rld an opportunity to interact and
d iscuss their successes and lessons learned
with one another. In-co un try assessments-also known as operational fiel d
evaluations-are another key ro raring the
needs of specific demining operations. A
team of rhe R&D Program's engineers
perform the assessments, after which rhe
host nation submits a fo rmal request fo r
specific tools.
The R&D Program interacts with
private industry, academia, other U.S .
and foreign government laboratories and
Army in-house laboratories and workshops in a slew of countries in order to
identifY emerging technologies that may
be suitable for humanitarian demin ing
missions. O nce a new rool or technology
has been successfi.tlly analyzed, it is deployed
to dem in ing organizations worldwide so

